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*Universlty of Chicago; University of Chicago and NBER, respectively.This paper surveys recent evidence on the impact of government
programs on the measured labor market status of black Americans. The
mid—sixties witnessed an outpouring of civil rights legislation unprecedented
since the time of the Civil War. In view of popular concern with civil
rights, it is remarkable that so little analysis of these programs is
available. Even more remarkable is the diversity of opinions offered by
the few professional economists who have analyzed these programs. Some claim
that governmental activity has been instrumental in reducing observed black—
white income differentials, although they do not specify particular channels
of influence. Other economists who investigate the effects of particular
programs document only miniscule effects of government policy.
These conflicting claims can be reconciled in part by examining
differences in data and methodology used by the dissenting analysts and in
part by taking a broader view of government policy than previous analysts
have considered. In this paper, we argue that previous studies neglect the
impact of recent government policy on the supply side of the labor market, and
that the supply side effects of recent policy play an important role in explaining
the recent measured increase in the ratio of the wages and incomes of blacks to
the 'ages and incomes of whites.
Most studies of black—white differences in earnings and wage rates
are conducted within a demand—oriented framework suitable to the textbook
economic analysis of discrimination. Within this framework, the role of
governmental civil rights policy is to tax discriminatory firms and to
subsidize nondiscriminatory behavior in order to favorably shift the demand
curve for black labor relative to that for white labor. This framework is
12
not inappropriate. Indeed, specific laws such as those implemented in
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbid both employment and wage
discrimination and hence act directly on the demand for black labor albeit
in potentially conflicting ways. Affirmative action programs instituted
by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) are designed to affect
the demand for black labor.
Even though a demand—oriented framework of analysis is not inappro-
priate, it is incomplete. Virtually coincident with recent civil rights
activity there has been an expansion of government welfare and transfer
programs. While these programs have not been explicitly oriented towards
specific racial groups, their criteria for participation have differentially
favored blacks by virtue of their lower position in the income distribution.
Income transfer programs raise the minimum wage that potential
labor market participants will voluntarily accept for market work and hence
tend to reduce the labor force activity of groups with low market wages, a
phenomenon observed in the past decade. Since blacks are over—represented
in the population potentially eligible for these programs, the induced
decline in their labor force participation and employment serves to raise
measured wage rates and earnings for market participants for two distinct
reasons.
First, even if all blacks are homogeneous in their ability to
perform market work, a reduction in the supply of blacks relative to whites
tends to raise the wage of working blacks relative to working whites as
long as blacks and whites are not perfect substitutes in the demand for labor
by firms. Second,
by removing the lowest wage blacks from the labor force, social transfer
programs can manufacture the illusion of relative wage growth by simply
subtracting the least productive blacks from the population base used to
measure wages and earnings.3
These supply side effects of government activity are not
the whole story of the recent convergence in black—white wage ratios but
they are an important and neglected component that deserves more stress
than previous studies have accorded it. These supply effects serve
to explain the apparent anomaly that prime age black male participation
rates have declined in the face of narrowing racial wage differentials,
a fact that cannot be explained by analysts who argue that the government
has improved the market position of black labor by reducing discrimination.
Despite our conviction that the scope of research on this question
should be broadened, we do not go far in performing that service here
although we do so in a companion paper. Rather, we confine our analysis
to a detailed review of previous evidence without restricting ourselves to
the view of the labor market maintained in previous studies.
The paper proceeds in the following way. We first review the basic
set of facts that any study of government impact should be able to explain.
We then review key features of recent antidiscrimination legislation. Then
we discuss problems in measuring the impact of such legislation and review
the findings of previous work. In an Appendix, we offer some evidence that
casts a new light on some of the previous evidence.
I. The Facts to be Explained
Before turning to an analysis of the impact of antidiscrimination
programs, it is useful to review the basic set of facts on the recent black
labor market experience with which any study of the impact of government
policy must contend. These facts are extracted from two principle sources
of data: aggregate time series data from the Current Population Surveys
(CPS) and information from cross sections removed in time, such as the 19604
and 1970 U.S. Census. The latter data have been extensively analyzed and
are rich in information about personal characteristics. The aggregate time
series data, while crude, are especially useful for examining broad trends
in black economic progress, and for determining the timing of the changes
in trends. For these reasons we turn to this data first.
A. The Time Series Data
Some graphs from a more extensive analysis (Butler andHeckman,1976)
are reproduced below. The time series data display the following features.
(1) Chart 1 reveals that the ratio of the median earnings of black
males to the median earnings of white males was roughly constant until the
mid—sixties at which point in time it began to grow at a rate which only
recently decelerated. The same ratio for women shows a steady upward growth
which accelerates in the mid—sixties——at about the same time that black male
relative earnings began to grow. For both sex groups, the growth in relative
earnings occurred at the same time that real earnings grew for all groups.
In the 1974 business cycle, all demographic groups suffered a decline in
real income but black relative status continued to grow.
Essentially the same story can be told for alternative measures of
income. The median earnings of full time workers (not shown here) display
the same pattern a that of the median earnings of all workers just discussed.
The rate of growth of relative income for full time workers is lower, suggest-
ing that part of the growth in relative black status recorded in Chart 1 is
due to a growth in relative hours worked by blacks.
Chart 2 presents relative median income, a measure that is defined
for the entire civilian population, and not just for wage earners, as is
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Chart 2 ——Relativemedian income and relative total labor force
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income in addition to earnings, and so provides a clearer picture of the
relative monetary welfare of the entire black population. The relative
median income data display the same pattern shown by the median earnings
data. The two measures differ only in that the relative income data
exhibit a lower rate of growth. To the extent that black economic welfare
has been raised by income transfer programs that reduce work effort, it is
expected that measured income defined for the entire black population would
exhibit a slower growth rate than the earnings of workers since it is
possible for a transfer program recipient to have lower money income and
fewer hours of work and still be better off than if he did not participate
in such a program.
(2) Chart 1 also reveals that the ratio of black male labor force
participation to white male participation exhibits a near stability until
the mid—sixties at which point it begins a rather steady decline. (From "1"
in 1965 to ".91" in 1975.) This decline is a result of a greater decline
in the aggregate black male participation rate than in the white rate, which
also fell. By no means is this decline confined to older males. As Chart 3
reveals, the labor force participation rate for prime age blacks has declined
relative to the rate for prime age whites which exhibits only a slight tendency
to drop over the post—war period. Indeed, as Chart 4 reveals, the recent
decline in the aggregate relative male rate is not due to a decline in the
relative participation rates of older workers.
From these charts, it is clear that there has been a narrowing in
racial wage and income differentials which began in the mid—sixties——coincident
with the emergence of federal antidiscrimination programs. It is precisely
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Chart3 ——Relativenonwhite to white median wage/salary income and
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Chart 4 ——Relativenonwhite to white labor force participation
rates for the civilian labor force 65 years and older; by sex.
Relative LFPR for
Relative LFPR for males
65 andolder10
role for government antidiscrimination policy. However, it is reasonable
to seek some explanation for the relative reduction of black workers in
the labor force that has been particularly pronounced among prime—age males.
increase
A simple demand induced / inblack wages and income should increase black
labor force participation relative to white labor force participation give
market opportunities for blacks have expanded. Yet, a decrease is observed.
The story for women is different. Although the relative female
participation rates (displayed in Chart 1) decline over the post—war period,
the relative decline accelerates in the mid—sixties. The decline in the
black female participation rate relative to the white rate reflects a slower
growth rate in the black rate and not a downturn. In fact, the black female labor
force participation rate has remained constant in the past eight years while
the white rate has continued to grow.
(3) Data on family income are displayed in Chart 5. The growth in
relative family income occurs in a brief period in the mid—sixties, and
there is little evidence of relative growth since then. This lack of growth
in relative family income is largely due to the growth in female headed
households among blacks recorded in Chart 6. One possible reason for the
growth in female headship rates among black families is the AFDC program which
provides incentives for the formation of female—headed households. The
average real payment per AFDC recipient rose in the mid—sixties at the same
time female headhsip rose among blacks.1 (See Chart 11, p. 56.) Even though
1Some caution Isrequired in interpreting this result, since greater
AFDC participation by unwed mothers may mechanically raise the measured pay-
ment per recipient. A cross sectional study by Honig (in Lerman, 1974)
documents a real effect of AFDC payments on headship rates so that the causal
correlation apparent in the time series has some support from independent
evidence. But, as pointed out to us by Glen Cain, Honig's AFDC inducement
variable——AFDC payments per family——potentially suffers from the same bias
as the AFDC per recipient variable, and may be as much a consequence as a
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Chart5 ——Medianreal income for black and white families
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Chart 6 ——Proportiorisoffemale—headed families;by race.13
black female relative income has been increasing, the level of female
income is lower than the level of male income, and given the increasing
fraction of female headed black families, this compositional effect serves
to retard the relative growth of black family incomes.
(4) The U.S. aggregate data confound distinct regional patterns
displayed in Charts 7, 8, 9 and 10. The key feature of these charts is
that the growth in relative median income that occurred for both males
and females in the aggregate data in the mid—sixties did not occur in
the West or the Northeast. The data for the South reveal that the growth
in the relative incomes of blacks began long before any of the recent
civil rights legislation was passed. Only the graph for the North Central
region displays any tendency for a jump in relative median income in the
mid—sixties, and this occurs only for males, and virtually disappears by
1975. The acceleration in the aggregate male ratio that appears in the
mid—sixties stems from the jump in the North Central ratio reinforced by
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B. Findings from the Disagregated Studies
A detailed review of all the disaggregated evidence on the determi-
nants of racial wage differentials is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet,
a discussion of the broad conclusions that emerge from these studies helps
to clarify the interpretation of time series evidence and affords a more
complete understanding of the aggregate trends.
The best available studies compare male earnings by race from large
cross sections of data calculated in different time periods. Welch (1973)
utilizes data from the 1960 Census and data from the 1967 Survey of Economic
Opportunity. Smith and Welch (1976) and Haworth, Gwartney and Haworth (1975)
use 1960 and 1970 Census data. The advantage of these studies is that they
present a richer analysis of the determinants of earnings than is possible
using aggregate data.
In his 1973 paper, Welch finds that black—white earnings differen—.
tials have been narrowed primarily through a reduction in wage differentials
among younger workers. Not only are younger blacks more educated than older
blacks, but the reward to their education is greater. And, racial differences
in schooling levels and market payment to schooling have narrowed foryounger
workers. He utilizes this finding, and other evidence on increases in school
expenditure for blacks, to conclude that increasing quality of schooling by
cohort explains the reduction in aggregate racial wage differentials. By no
means does this evidence exclude competing hypotheses. To the extent that
affirmative action programs create a premium for blacks in the labor market,
the effect os such programs would be greatest for the youngest blacks because
firms are more likely to invest in younger workers (to harvest returns from
workers with longer expected working lives) and because young workers, with
long lifetime horizons, are more likely to invest in themselves and respond
to increased labor market incentives.19
In a later paper, Smith and Welch (1976) find less evidence for a
young—cohort effect and more evidence for across—cohort improvements in
earnings in explaining 1960—1970 changes in earnings. This contrast with
Welch's previous findings may be due, in part, to differences in treatment
of nonworking blacks in the two studies. Smith and Welch eliminate non—
working blacks from their 1970 sample while Welch (1973) did not eliminate
this group in 1967. As noted in Chart 3, the labor force participation rate
of prime age black males has been declining in the decade 1960—1970. It is
plausible to assume that it is lowest wage blacks who became the non—
participants. If this is so, Smith and Welch manufacture an apparent
relative wage growth for older black workers which may not, in fact, exist.
This bias induced by sample selection procedures accounts for the discrep-
ancy between the findings of these two studies, and leads us to conclude
that most of the measured relative wage gains have accrued to younger, more
educated black workers. Evidence by Freeman (1977) supports this view.
A study by Haworth, Gwartney and Haworth (1975) corroborates the
Welch (1973) view. These authors find that an important component of measured
black wage gain is the retirement of older black workers from the labor
foráe. This effect arises not because the black retirement rate exceeds the
white rate, but because of the relatively lower quality of older workers
relative to younger workers in the black population than is the case in the
white population.
There is broad agreement on the other findings.
(1) Relative wage gains have been greatest in the South.
(2) Migration contributes little to measured relative wage growth
in the sense that while regional racial wage differentials exist, the volume20
of migration weighted by theregional differentials is a negligiblecomponent of
aggregate racial relative wage growth.
(3) The contribution of federalgovernment employment to the reduction
in black—white wage differences is minor.While the black—white wage ratio is
higher in the government than in the privatesector, federal government employ-
ment has been relatively stabej. over thepast decade. In addition, black—white
wage ratios inside and outside of government havecome closer together because
of a greater narrowing in privatesector racial differentials.
(4) The conventional wisdom that black—white incomeratios decrease
for more educated workers no longerapplies and there is some evidence that
ratios increase by education class.
(5) Growth in the average level of schoolingamong blacks is an
important source of the observed decline in racialearnings differentials.
(6) Controlling for industry, age, education, andlocation variables,
and for shifts in coefficients on these variablesin earnings equations
(interpreted as shifts in payments for productiveattributes), more than half
of the observed reduction in the black—whiteearnings differential remains
unexplained. Haworth, Gwartney and Haworth allocate theresidual to government
activity aid the like, but it is important to note thatno direct evidence on
this question exists in any of these microstudies, nor is there any information
as to the timing of the observed changes within theperiod 1960—1970.
II. Key Features of Principal AntidiscrimjnatjonPrograms
The main pillars of federal antidiscriminationpolicy in the private
sector have been the Office of Federal ContractComplaince (OFCC) and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which created theEqual Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Manyinterestinginstitutional facts about these programs
are recorded more fully elsewhere in this volume and neednot be repeated here.21
Until recently (1972), the EEOC has had limited enforcement powers
and has acted primarily as a fact finding agency, investigating employee—
initiated reports of wage and employment discrimination; and acting as a
conciliation agency, seeking to reach out—of—court settlements between
aggrieved workers and firms. With the exception of firms with fewer than
25 employees, firms not engaged in interstate commerce, the self—employed,
and state and local governments, most employers were covered by the EEOC.
By law, the EEOC was required to refer cases to state fair—employment
practices commissions (where they existed), although the record shows that
most cases so referred returned to the EEOC (Beller, 1974, p. 23). In the
event of unsuccessful arbitration, workers could use the courts to bring
individual suits against firms, with the EEOC serving as a friend of the
court. In principle, the EEOC could invite the Justice Department to
present cases, although rio information is available as to how often this
avenue was used. Since 1972, the EEOC has had the power to initiate
litigation and has met with some success. However, official reports suggest
that delays in litigation are rather lengthy.
The view of informed observers of the EEOC, best represented in the
paper by Phyllis Wallace (1973), suggests that the agency is understaffed,
limited in political status and legal power, and slow to process claims.
These first—hand observations suggest that the EEOC is unlikely to have had
a major impact—a view widely held in policy circles.
The OFCC was established in 1965 to administer an executive order
forbidding discrimination by government contractors in any of their
operations. This agency is responsible for the affirmative action time
tables required of many firms and unions. Unlike the EEOC, the OFCC has22
always had enforcement powers, although it has rarely used them. These
powers include the right to cancel government contracts and to prevent
firms from bidding on future contracts. Unlike thecoverage of EEOC, the
coverage of OFCC is restricted to firms that voluntarily agree to sell goods
to the government; so, in principle, OFCC is not a compulsoryprogram.
Knowledgeable observers such as J. Jones (1976) and G. Ahert (1976) report
on the ineffectiveness of the OFCC compliance machinery and foster suspicion
of its contribution to eliminating measured black—white wage differentials
even before any data are considered.
The principal vehicles for state antidiscrimination efforts have
been the state fair—employment practices commissions. (For a complete
description, see Landes, 1966.) These commissions have worked in cooperation
with the EEOC and deserve consideration in their own right, if only because
they have been studied more carefully than most federal programs. These
analyses have served as prototypes for the analysis of federal programs.
The anecdotal evidence available on all of these programs and agencies
leads one to suspect that they have had negligible effects on improving
minority status. This sort of evidence has led some to dismiss the possi-
bilIty that these agencies have had important effect on minority status.
III. Measures of Program Impact and Their Interpretation
Before turning to the detailed evidence on the programs just discussed,
it is helpful to consider what might be expected from them, the merits of
various measures of their impact, and the limitations of the data and empirical
techniques used to measure this impact.
First consider the expected consequences of these programs. As
Merton (1936) noted long ago, the consequences of legislation often differ23
from the stated intentions of legislators. Antidiscrimination programs
may provide an example of this principle. Some economists have argued that
affirmative action programs lead to an inefficient use of economic resources
because they interfere with a preexisting optimum allocation of resources.
If this is so, the real wages of all workers——black and white——may be
reduced even though the relative wages of blacks increase.
As another example of Merton's principle, Landes (1966) and Belier
(1974) both note that antidiscrimination programs such as EEOC and state
fair—employment laws often contain conflicting provisions. Laws that lead
to equality in wage rates by race may cause firms to substitute white labor
for black labor, working counter to the employment provisions of laws that
enjoin firms to hire proportionately more minorities in occupations in which
they are under—represented. To insist that wage and employment provisions
be enforced may be to insist on an economically inefficient use of resources.
There are several possible consequences of this inefficiency. Affected
entrepreneurs may shut down their operations, or curtail investment in their
plaxitsor relocate to areas not covered by the regulations. The higher costs
of operation necessarily imply higher prices for goods in affected indus-
tries and a smaller quantity of output demanded. This leads to lower total
employment in sectors covered by the legislation although not necessarily
lower minority employment. If a smaller minority employment occurs, the
legislation enhances the status of blacks in surviving firms but may cause
an exodus of other blacks from the covered sector. If all firms in the
economy are covered, the black exodus is from the mainstream economy into
a variety of nonmarket pursuits. Micro data on surviving firms which record
improvement in the relative position of blacks is not inconsistent with macro
data which record a reduction in black status relative to white status.24
There are other examples of possible unintended effects of anti—
discrimirtation legislation. Occupational racial quotas imposed in an attempt
to move the black job distribution closer to the white job distribution
may lead to a reduction in the employment of low skill blacks. Having
too many blacks in low—skill occupations is just as much a violation of
affirmative action as having too few blacks in high skill occupations.
If quotas are met by firing unskilled blacks or adopting a preferential
hiring pattern for low—skilled whites, the effect of such quotas will be
to reduce both the wages and employment of unskilled black labor.
If, as Johnson and Welch (1976) suggest, firms meet the requirement for
skilled black labor by promoting unskilled (and unqualified) blacks to
skilled jobs, productive inefficiency may result. Moreover, if unskilled
blacks are hired merely to "meet the quota", the long termconsequenceof
such a policy may be to retard black incentives to acquire skills. Thus,
such programs may result in a long run widening in the average level of
acquired skills held by each race group.
The upshot of this discussion is that the evaluation of the conse-
quences of a program should be separated from the evaluation of program
effectiveness. The most effective program may have the worst consequences
from the point of view of elevating the real income of blacks. Moreover,
this discussion suggests that a variety of measures of program impact may
be useful in order to assess both good and bad consequences of legislation.
Closely related to the analysis of program impact is the question of
devising appropriate measures for evaluating programs. Most analysts who
proceed within the demand—oriented framework of the economics of discrimina-
tion assume that relative wage rates or relative incomes are key policy
goals. While wage ratios are important, they measure only one aspect of25
the effect of laws on black status. Presumably the goal of any antidis—
crimination program is to improve black economic welfare in both the short
rtin and the long run. For either time frame, wage ratios may be a poor
measure of black welfare.
This is an empirically important problem because the data from the
last decade show that racial differences in real wage rates have widened
while ratios have declined. A widening in the level of wage rates may lead
to a widening in racial schooling and training differentials, and hence to
a widening in long run earnings differentials. If the real return to
schooling has increased for blacks, it has increased more for whites if the
direct costs of schooling are the same for both race groups.
A fixation on the wage rates or the incomes of full time workers
neglects the impact of legislation on employment, labor force participation
and stability of employment for blacks. Surely one goal of policy is to
increase black incomes and to integrate blacks into the main stream economy.
Measurements of higher wage rates paid to working blacks confound intra—
occupational narrowing of racial differentials with interoccupational advances.
Measurements of both components are required in order to determine the sources
of black improvement and.the probability of permanence of the improvement.
Patterns of unemployment differentials, labor force participation, school
attendance and the like all yield information about the degree to which
blacks are integtated into the economy.
Most studies surveyed below focus on the relative wage rates of
blacks and exclude many important nonwage dimensions. Accordingly, these
studies yield an incomplete picture of total government impact. In particular,
all focus on short run effects, so that estimates of long run consequences of
antidiscrimination legislation are not available.26
In addition to the problem of the limited number of measures of black
status that have been studied, there is also an important problem that arises
from the fact that most of the antidiscriminatjonprograms considered below
do not cover all firms in the economy. The existence of a residual uncovered
sector has important implications for the measurement of program impacts. Laws
elevating black wages in a covered sector may depress wages in the uncovered
sector because covered—sector firms tend to hire fewer blacks at the higher
wages and release blacks to the uncovered sector, driving down wage rates there.
Comparisons of the relative wages of blacks in covered and uncovered sectors at
a given point in time of the sort utilized in many studies reported below lead
to an overstatement of the economy—wide impact of such a program. One must resort
to aggregate time series data to estimate true program impacts. On the other hand,
if legislation causes the employment and wages of blacks to rise in the
covered sector, wages also rise in the uncovered sector. In thiscase,
cross sectional comparisons understate the contribution of legislation to
relative minority status. Again, resort to time series evidence is required
in order to assess the impact of legislation. Cross sectional evidence
need not be consistent with the time series evidence.
Finally, it is important to note that the presence of laws, contract
compliance reviews or government contract awards is not independent of the
environment in which they occur. Yet most studies surveyed below ignore
this point.. Accordingly, estimated program impacts from these studiescon-
found a pure policy effect with preexisting conditions that cause the policy
to be effected.
OFCC provides a case in point. In this program, the government seeks
to impose antidiscrimination provisions on its contractors. If thegovern-
ment also seeks to purchase its goods at the lowest price (say through the
process of competitive bidding) it tends to select the least discriminating
firms with higher proportions of black workers. Studies comparing !covered1?27
and "uncovered" firms may record a successful selection process by the
government but convey no information on the real impact of the program on
black status. In this case, measured OFCC effects overstate actual effects
(Hecknian and Wolpin, 1976).
The direction of this bias may be reversed.PP05e that all firms are
alike and that the government runs a lottery to determine which firms are
to be its contractors. All contractors must comply with the provisions of
OFCC and are fully compensated for their increased costs. If, as much
theory and evidence suggest, it is costly to hire and fire labor, all firms
roughly
would have/the same racial composition in their work force. A cross sectional
comparison of contractors with noncontractors, or a time series study of
firms classified by contract status would reveal little or no program effect. Only
an aggregate time series analysis would record shifts in black status induced
by the contract compliance program.
This analysis also applies to macro studies. Antidiscrimination
programs like EEOC and OFCC may well be the consequence and not the cause of
reduced discrimination against blacks. If this is so, aggregate evidence on
the effect of policy overstates the true impact of thepolicy.
The upshot of this discussion is that any analysis of policy impact
is incomplete and purely descriptive until some account is made of how the
policy came into existence. Virtually none of the estimates of program
impact reported below can be used to estimate the expected impact of programs
initiated without regard to the factors that cause policy to be effected.28
IV. AReview and Reconsideration of the Evidence From
Aggregate Time Series on the Impact of Government Policy
A. Introduction
The work of Freeman (1973) is the most influential analysis of the
impact of government policy on the status of blacks in the aggregate. In
his paper, Freeman utilizes a time series of annual observations on relative
black status to conclude that cumulative EEOC expenditure, interpreted as a
proxy measure for the entire package of federal antidiscrimination programs
passed in the mid—sixties, raised the relative wages and earnings of blacks
(as well as raising other indices that record relative racial occupational
position). The shift in economic status due to government activity is
proportionately greater for black women relative to white women than it is
for black men relative to white men (Freeman, 1973, Table 6). Freeman's
study has been widely cited as evidence for the success of recent government
policy.
In this section, we examine Freeman's findings and argue that his
conclusions are refuted when a properly specified model is estimated. Our
analysis rests on the observation that if the demand for labor has shifted
favorably toward blacks one would expect that the market participation of
blacks relative to the market participation of whites would not have decreased.
But, Chart1of Section I shows that it did decrease. And, as noted in Chart
3 of that section, the decrease is quite pronounced among prime age males,
so that the aggregate decline is not solely a phenomenon of declines among
peripheral workers.
There are important consequences of this decrease in participation.
A general reduction in the relative quantity of black labor relative to white29
labor should raise black relative wage rates. This is so as long as the
two types of labor are not perfect substitutes in demand. There are several
reasons advanced in the economics literature why blacks and whites need
not be perfect substitutes in demand. The first reason, proposed by Gary
Becker (1957) arises from employer tastes for discrimination. The greater
the proportion of blacks in a population, the more likely it is that blacks must
the
deal with/more bigoted employers and accordingly must settle for lower wages.
The second reason, advanced by Finis Welch (1967) is that blacks and whites
are imperfect substitutes because they possess different average skill
levels and because workers of different skill are not perfect substitutes
(Griliches, 1968). The third reason, due to Kenneth Wolpin (1974), arises
from a model of firm uncertainty about worker quality. Even if the average
black had the same quality at work as the average white, if the dispersion
of quality in the black population differs from the dispersion of quality
in the white population, blacks and whites are imperfect substitutes in
demand.
The situation of less than perfect substitutibility in demand is depected in the
Figure (next page)which displays the relative wage of blacks as a function
of their relative quantities. A reduction in the realtive quantity of blacks
from A to A' should raise their relative wage from R to R'.
The cause of the reduction in the relative quantities of black labor
mayhaveadditional consequences for the measured relative wage of working
blacks. If, as is surely the case, there is some distribution of skills in
the black population, it is important to know which blacks exitthe labor
force. In a companion paper, we present evidence that the reduction in the
black work force came from the low wage black population which is a larger
fraction of the total black population of workers than the low wage whitepopulation is of the white population. Given the expansion of social welfare
programs in the mid—sixties, coincident with EEOC andOFCCactivity, propor-
tionately more blacks participated in these programs than did whites——a result
which is entirely consistent with the view that blacks and whites of identical
demographic characteristics have the same propensity to participate in work
reducing income transfer programs but that blacks occupy a lower position
in the income distribution.
These transfer program induced changes in-the composition of the
black work force tend to raise measured average (and median) wage rates for
working blacks relative to comparable masures for working whites. Such
changes create the illusion of black progress as measured. Further, the
increases in real transfer program benefits that occurred in the mid—sixties,
















Using regression analysis, Freeman estimates relative demand curve
DD' under the assumption that it is horizontal, i.e., that blacks and whites
are perfect substitutes in demand This is a strong assumption which turns
out to be counterfactual. The determinants of relative wage rates for both
men and women that are considered by Freeman are (1) a time trend, ref lect—
ing productivity growth and a shift in attitudes towards blacks (2) deviations
from trend real GNP——a variable designed to capture the idea that tight labor
markets are favorable for minorites (3) cumulative EEOC to the
date of the observation on relative wage rates——a variable designed to
capture the cumulative effect of all federal antidiscrimination activity on
relative wages,
/and (4) relative mean education levels—a variable designed to capture the
effect of improvements in the quality of the black labor force relative to
the white labor force. His empirical results show (1) that there has been
for both sexes
a smooth upward trend in relative status/that is more pronounced for black
women (2) that there is evidence that black relative status is procyclical
(3) that federal activity has been instrumental in eliminating black—white
wage differences and (4) that relative education has an important positive
effect on relative minority status.
Flanagan (1976) was the first to systematically criticize the Freeman
analysis. He noted that when relative education is introduced into Freeman's
equation for males, the measured impact of federal activity vanishes although
it does not vanish in the female equation. He conjectures that Freeman's
1 alternative interpretation of Freeman's procedure is that he
follows A.shenfelter (1970) in assuming that relative quantities are fixed
for males. While this assumption is appropriate for Ashenfelter's sample
period (1948—1966), it is not appropriate for a post—1966 analysis. Yet
another interpretation of Freeman's equation is possible. Under this view,
Freeman's relative wage equation is a function of the determinants of both
the supply curve and the demand curve. If this interpretation is adopted,
Freeman omits determinants of supply behavior. For a more extensive discus-
sion of this issue, see Butler and Heckman (1977) or Appendix A.32
finding that federal impact is weaker on the relative wages of full—time
workers, as compared with its much stronger effect on relative median
earnings of all workers, may reflect the fact that EEOC expenditure grew
rapidly during a period of sustained low aggregate unemployment rates so
that Freeman's measure of federal activity is nothing more than a proxy for
unusually favorable macroeconomic conditions. To support this conjecture,
Flanagan notes that In Freeman's work there is no evidence of a federal
impact on relative full—time female earnings.
In an effort to examine these and other claims, we reworked the
time series data, updating Freeman's analysis through 1974, experimenting
with alternative models, and disaggregating by region. Because the last
few years are ones of high unemployment, they provide a test of Flanagan's
conjecture that Freeman's measure of federal activity is a proxy variable
for the unusually low unemployment rates of the late sixties. The results
of our empirical analysis, reported more fully elsewhere (Butler and Hecknian,
1976) and briefly summarized in Appendix A to this paper, are as follows.
(1) Expansion of the data base to include years of high unemployment
does not alter the conclusions to be drawn from Freeman's specification.
Experimentation with the specification of unemployment variables results in
little change in Freeman's original conclusions. From our analysis, we
conclude that Freeman's federal activity variable does not proxy labor market
tightness.
(2) When relative education variables are included in equations with
relative median earnings as the dependent variable, measured EEOC effects
remain for both sex groups, so that Flanagan's criticism is inappropriate.
(3) When a relative labor force participation variable is added to
the basic Freeman model augmented to include a relative education variable,33
and appropriate statistical methods are used to estimate the relative
demand equation, there is noimpact of measured federal antidiscrimination policy on
relative
/wage rates for men or for women.Relative labor force participation
levels are sensitive to demographic variables, education, and benefit
levels per recipient in federal transfer programs.
(4) An analysis of regional data on relative median incomes utiliz-
ing Freeman's own specification of the relative demand curve (i.e., assuming
that this curve is perfectly elastic) reveals no impact of his measure of
federal activity in any region but the South, although there is a weak effect
on North Central region male relative median income. Given differential
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in the South in the mid—sixties, this
finding appears to be prima facie evidence in support of Freeman's analysis.
Yet an examination of Chart 10 reveals that the upward trend in relative
black status in the South began in the late fifties——long before any federal
antidiscrimination legislation was passed.2 Indeed, when only the most
recent 14 years of Southern data are used to fit the Freeman model, there is
no measured impact of federal activity on the relative incomes of blacks.
The last two findings lead us to conclude that there has been some
government effect on the status of blacks. But it is not the effect that
Freeman sought to measure. In our view, the expansion of income transfer
programs that occurred during the War on Poverty removed blacks from the
labor force at a greater rate than it removed whites. This transfer program
induced withdrawal of blacks lead to growth in the measured relative wage of
1By "appropriate statistical methods" we mean a standard two stage
least squares procedure in which the quantity of black labor relative to
the quantity of white labor is regressed on appropriate instrumental variables.
For a list of instrumental variables see Butler and Heckman (1977) or Appendix A.
2King and Marshall (1974), using different data also note this
phenomenon.34
working blacks relative to working whites, and accounts for the measured
decline in relative labor force participation rates that is quite pronounced
among prime age black males. This hypothesis also accounts for the
observed slower growth in relative full—time wage rates since full—time
workers are likely to be high—wage workers, and hence their measuredwage
rates are less likely to be affected by the compositional effect of transfer
programs in elminiriating low wage workers from the statistics.
C. A Brief Discussion of Vroman's Analysis
The work of Vroman (1973) has been interpreted as evidence in support
of Freeman's work. Vroman analyzes a time series of cross sectional observa-
tions on workers (with positiveearnings) registered with the Social Security
Administration. His empirical results show a shift in the earnings of black
earners relative to white earners for both sexes. The most pronounced shift
occurs among southern workers although there is some evidence of a shift in
relative male earnings in the North Central region as well. He does not
trace the source of the shift to any particular agency. These findings
appear to complement Freeman's analysis since the South was the locus of
the greatest antidiscrimination efforts.
Before this conclusion is drawn, there are several points to note in
Vroman's study. (1) His analysis is conducted only for workers, is not a
panel study, and is thus subject to the same wage growth inducing selection
bias arising from labor force withdrawal that plagues the Freeman (1973) and Smith
and Welch (1975) studies.(2) While there is evidence of structural shift
in an earnings regression
in southern earnings (based on a significant coefficient/on a duimny variable
that is "one" for blacks after 1965), Vroman does not test the hypothesis
that the shift occurred before 1965, as Chart 10 strongly suggests is the35
case.1 Indeed, if there has been steady improvement in black status in the
South, one would expect Vroman's empirical result precisely because later
earnings are higher than earlier earnings, and not because of any dramatic
change in the condition of blacks in the South in 1965.
V. A Review of the Disaggregated Studies
A. Evidence from the Analysis of State Fair—
Employment Practice (FEP) Commissions
In its original charter, the EEOC was instructed to cooperate with
state fair—employment practices commissions and to refer cases to them when
appropriate. Accordingly, it is of some interest to document the impact of
these commissions on black labor market status. Studies of state fair employ-
ment practices commissions provide examples of some of the best available
work that measures the impact of government programs.
The best work on this topic is a study by Landes (1968), who examined
the impact of the wage and employment provisions of fair—employment practices
laws. His analysis is conducted within the framework of the economics of
discrimination developed by Becker (1957). State fair—employment laws are
assumed to shift the demand curve for black labor relative to the demand for
white labor (DD' in Figure 1 of Section IV). A crucial assumption in his
empirical work is that both black and white workers are immobile across
states, so that supplies of each type of labor are inelasticly supplied to
the market within each state.2 A regression model is developed in which
11965 was the year that the EEOC commenced operation.
2Landes follows Becker (1957) in this assumption. It is as crucial
to Becker's theoretical argument as it is to Landes' empirical analysis. If
there is free migration across state lines, black—white wage differentials
will be the same in each state if racial differences in psychic income are
negligible. And, in the presence of migration there could be no measured
effect of fair—employment legislationon the status of blacks measured in a
cross section, even if fair—employment laws as a group raise black status in
the aggregate.36
alternative indices of black status are regressed on a dummy variable
(which assumes the value of 1 when a state has a fair—employment law, and
is zero otherwise) and on other control variables. The regression coef-
ficient on the dummy variable is interpreted as a measure of the effect
of the law on black status in states with such laws relative to black
status in states without such laws.
Utilizing 1960 aggregates for the 48 contiguous states, Landes finds
a quantitatively small (3 to 4 percent), weakly statistically significant
improvement in the relative earnings of black males due to the enforcement
of equal pay provisions of fair—employment laws. This effect is partly
offset by the increased unemployment of blacks relative to whites which
results from the enforcement of wage provisions of the laws. In regressions
utilizing income and occupational position as dependent variables, Landes
finds no effect of the legislation. This work provides evidence for con—
flicting effects of fair—employment practices legislation which cancel Out
in the aggregate andyieldno measured effect.
In a later study, Ligget (1969) claims to find a strong effect of
fair—employment practice commissions on black status. In our judgment, his
evidence is too crude to be taken seriously. His analysis consists of
a single rank correlation between an index of change in black occupational
distributions relative to white occupational distributions (measured from
the 1950 and 1960 Censuses) and an index of the strength of fair—employment
in his sample.
commissions governing each location! The data base is a scattered sample of
cities and states. Both of his indices are suspect. The first index is
defined to include only selected skilled occupations (those with average
education exceeding 12 years) and thus excludes many black employees. The
second index is derived from an ad hoc weighting of enforcement authority
and budgets derived from the work of Norgren and Hill (1964).37
•
Heckman (1976)reanalyzes the Landes data to determine whether or
not the incidence of fair—employment practices laws by state can be
related to economic variables, and if so, whether a more careful treatment
of laws as socially determined events affects Landes' estimate of the
impact of fair—employment laws on black status. He presents evidence that
of the work force
higher levels of education and a greater percent of unionism/in a given
state favor passage of fair—employment legislation. Using a new statistical
technique, he doubles Landes' estimate of the effect of fair—employment
of laws
laws on earnings (to 7.5 percent) and finds that the measured effect/becomes
strongly statistically significant. Unfortunately, Heckman does not present
estimates for the other indices of black status employed by Landes, so that
it is not possible to determine whether or not Landes' conclusions on the
total effect of the law would be sustained in a more careful econometric
analysis. Nonetheless, these new findings suggest that there may have been a greater
impact of FEPlegislationthan previous analysts have measured.
B. Micro Studies of EEOC
Because the coverage of EEOC is so extensive, all micro studies of
the impact of EEOC rely on a comparison between firms or states that are
amounts of
subject to different /treatment!Iof EEOC activity. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no study that compares the progress of blacks in EEOC—
covered firms with black progress in uncovred firms.
Adams (1972) presents one of the first attempts to measure the direct
impact of the EEOC on the relative employment of minorities in the period
1966 to 1971. During this period, the EEOC did not have the power to initiate
any direct civil or criminal action in the courts——and so was limited to
seeking compliance with Title Vllthrough its conciliation efforts in cases38
in which racial discrimination was alleged. In both the case studies and
statistical analysis he presents, Adams confirms popular folk wisdom about
the inefficacy of the EEOC's conciliation process. He tests for a direct
effect of conciliation by pairing 26 "respondent" firms (those who signed
a"successfuj. conciliation"involving race as an issue in 1967 and 1968) with
peer firms in the same two—digit industry and SMSA (Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area). He finds no significant improvement in the respondent
group (relative to the peer group) in measures of relative employment or
occupational position. In a regression analysis, Adams finds that the
intensity of conciliation activity in an SMSA is an insignificant determi-
nant of either change in SNSA minority share of employment or SNSA change
in relative occupational position.
Adams' tests may not be conclusive for two reasons. First, he
implicitly assumes that during the period of his study the EEOC focused on
the enforcement of the employment provisions of Title VII. If, instead, the
EEOC concentrated on enforcing the wage provision of the legislation and
succeeded in improving the relative wages of blacks while not lowering
relative black employment, (a question not examined by Adams), its impact would,
in fact, have been substantial. Second, even if the EEOC were more concerned
with discrimination in employment than with discrimination in wage rates
during the period of his analysis, it is still possible that firms with a
"successful conciliation" were initially the least discriminatory firms.
Even though the conciliation process may induce recalcitrant firms
to hire more blacks, if the EEOC chose to focus its conciliation efforts on
firms already upgrading minority employees, the EEOC procedure for selecting firms
would serve to explain why in 16 of the 26 pairs, "respondent" firms had a39
higher proportion of minority employees in 1966 than did their peers and
also why (in 11 of the 26 pairs) they had superior 1966 relative occupa-
tional indices. Thus, without a clearer notion of how respondent firms
are chosen, it is not possible to make any inference about the impact of
EEOC from Adams' analysis.
Utilizing the case study method, Wolkinson (1973) and Marshall (1976)
conclusions
reinforce Adams' pessimistic / regardingthe impact of EEOC's concilia-
tion and minority litigation efforts. Examining 75 instances of alleged
union discrimination, Wolkinson finds that, after settlements are reached,
they often provide inadequate relief to the workers involved, or are not
adhered to by the unions involved. These cases arose prior to the 1972
law permitting the EEOC to initiate litigation proceedings, and the author
attributes the lack of measured impact to the absence of any EEOC enforce-
ment power. For the construction industry, Marshall (1976) finds that
Title VII suits are always long and costly in terms of lawyer years, and
that the effects of the court proceedings are empirically difficult to dis-
tinguish from the effects of concurrent civil rights activity. While litiga-
tion appears to have had a minimal direct impact, Marshall asserts that the
court cases had a substantial impact in furthering the "hometown" plans in
areas involved in litigation.
Kidder (1972) analyzes data from the textile industry in North and
South Carolina in an attempt to determine whether it was federal antidis—
crimination programs or a tightening of the labor market that was responsible
for the observed increase in black employment in that industry in the 1960's.
Like Adams, Kidder assumes that the EEOC concentrated on enforcement of the
employment provision of Title VII. She finds a negative correlation between40
EEOC charges and subsequent increases in black employment, and estimates
that the presence of a government contract in a firm insignificantly affects
black employment.
The principle thrust of her analysis is directed toward disproving
the tight labor market hypothesis. She finds, for instance, that the major
black employment breakthrough in the textile industry came in 1963—65, before
the industry's overall unemployment rate dropped in 1966 (and before EEOC
was established). However, as Waisgiass (1972) notes, the relevant unemploy-
ment rate is not the textile industry's rate, but that of the labor markets
• . • 1
in the Carolinas, which started falling in 1962.
The most sophisticated of all of the micro EEOC studies is the
unpublished Ph.D. thesis of Andrea Belier (1974). This work explores the
effect of charges filed on both the relative employment and relative wages
of black males. Beller's study is the first to disentangle conflicting wage
and employment effects of Title VII legislation and is a clear improvement
on previous work. Using State data drawn from the 1970 Census matched with
EEO-1 data assembled by Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976), she finds a net





6162 63 64 65 66 167 68 69 70
North Carolina4.14.45.53.73.63.32.51.82.11.71.52.4
SouthCarolina3.43.54.53.13.22.82.21.62.31.81.62.7
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract (various issues) .41
relative to whites. A strong negative effect on employment that results
from enforcement of Title VII wage equality provisions (measured by the
number of charges filed with wage inequality as an issue) swamps a weak
positive employment effect that results from enforcement of Title VII
employment provisions (measured by the number of charges filed with employ-
ment discrimination as the principle issue).
Belier also estimates the impact of charges filed on black relative
wage rates. Her estimates display the same kind of offsetting behavior
found in the relative employment regressions; a greater number of wage
charges filed results in an increase in measured relative wages while a
greater number of employment charges filed results in a measured decrease
in wages. The two effects cancel. In both studies, she explicitly recognizes
the problem of mutual causation between charges and outcomes and presents
1
methods for removing the bias that results from reverse causation.The
conclusion from both analyses is that total charges filed with the EEOC,
interpreted as proxies for the enforcement of the wage and employment provisions
of Title VII, had a slight negative impact on relative black employment and
a negligible (and possibly perverse) impact on black relative wages. Her
the
work thus provides some support for/notion that the cure of antidiscrimination
legislation may be worse than the disease, and that the consequences of con-
flicting provisions in legislation may be quite perverse.
C. Micro Studies of OFCC
In contrast with the diversity of approaches and data used to measure
the impact of EEOC, most micro studies of the impact of OFCC use the same
1
However, her solution to this problem is based on the somewhat
questionable assumption that the presence of a regional EEOC office in a
state affects the volume of charges filed in the state.42
methodology and the same source of data: the annual EEO—l tapes. These
tapes contain information on employment and occupational distributions for
all major race—sex groups in firms covered by EEOC. No information is
available on wages or salaries, but whether the firm has a government
contract (and hence is covered by OFCC) is given, although the size of
the contract and its contribution to a firm's total sales is not. Due to
the absence of any measure of wages, analysts of OFCC have focused on the
impact of the presence of a government contract (measured by a dummy variable)
on the employment and occupational position of minorities within firms.
Table 1 presents a summary of the principal empirical results from
the four principle studies of OFCC. The authors and sample period for each
study are given in Column 1.1 Control variables used in the regression
analysis performed in these studies are given in Column 2, and estimates
for the index of minority status indicated at the top of each column are
recorded in the final three columns. The key to the right of the table
defines the variables.
All authors claim to estimate demand equations for firms, although
Burman supplements his model with supply variables that contribute nothing
to the fit of his equations. Ashenfelter and Heckman, and Heckman and
Wolpin interpret their estimates within a dynamic adjustment framework and
claim to estimate both long—run and short—run effects.2
1With the exception of the sample used in the Heckman—Wolpin (1976)
study, all samples are national. (Heckinan and Wolpin use data from the
Chicago consolidated SMSA.) The Ashenfelter—Heckman (1976) paper and the
Burman (1973) paper use samples from the late sixties when OFCC was newly
established, while the Goldstein—Smith (1976) and Heckman—Wolpin studies
cover a later period.
2Long—run effects are measured under the implicit assumption that
current prices and wages prevail in the future, and hence are inaccurate
to the extent that the stationarity hypothesis is invalid.43
The first three papers treat the presence of a government contract
as an exogenous event, beyond the control of the firm (or the government);
the Iieckman—Wôlpin paper presents evidence that contract status is determined
by firm (and government) policy, and methods are devised to circumvent the
bias that results from mutual causation between receipt of a contract and a
firm's policy toward minorities.1
As recorded in the Table, Ashenfelter and Heckman find that in the
short run government contractors raise the employment of black males
relative to white males 3.3 percent more than nongoverument contractors do,
while in the long run this effect is estimated to be 12.9 percent. These
numbers bracket Burman's estimate (which should be interpreted as an average
of short—run and long—run effects), and are ittroughagreement with the
estimates of Heckman andWolpinfor a later period. The only discordant
estimate in this table is that of Goldstein andSmith,who find evidence
for a statistically insignificant decline in black status among government
contractors
Unlike the authors of the other papers, Ashenfelter and Heckman
attempt to measure the economy—wide impact of OFCC on the relative employ-
ment of blacks. (See the second pair of numbers in Row 1, Columns 3—5.)
These estimates are obtained from the first pair of numbers by weighting
each number by the proportion of workers covered by OFCC (50 percent in
their sample). These estimates have meaning only if the measured relative
impact is directly related to the absolute (economy—wide) impact, and it
clearly need not be.
1The Reckman—Wolpinpaper is also the only paper in this group to
account for serial correlation in the presence of lags in firms' adjustment
to long—run equilibrium.
maybedue to their inclusion of a compliance review variable
along with a government contract variable. Even if the former variable
belongs in the equation, the estimated impact of contract status, holding
compliance reviews constant, would be expected to be less than if a compliance



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross sectional comparisons between contractor and noncontractor
firms are intrinsically uninformative on the question of OFCC's economy—
wide impact on the position of blacks. The best one can hope to measure is
the differential between contractor and noncontractor firms. Without more
information on the structure of labor markets than is available from any of
these studies, these estimates yield no information on the true impact of
OFCC on the relative position of blacks in the economy. A 3.3 percent
differential can arise either because blacks are reshuf fled among firms or
because of an influx of blacks into the labor market. In presenting their
calculation of economy—wide impacts, Ashenfelter and Heckman implicitly
assume the latter interpretation, although their estimated relative impact
is consistent with either interpretation.
The results for black female employment relative to white female
employment, and the results for relative occupational position for both
sexes suggest either small favorable or negligible negative impacts.1 The
male
same criticism levied against the black/employment indices also applies to
measurements of these indices. Cross sectional estimates are intrinsically
ambiguous and are neither evidence for nor evidence against the role of OFCC
in promoting the status of blacks. From these studies, we can conclude that
OFCC has altered the behavior of firms or at least has sorted out firms by
their treatment of minorities. We cannot conclude from these studies that
the OFCC has served to elevate black status, nor can we (as do Smith and
Welch, 1976) conclude that it has not.
Other pieces of evidence suggest that the OFCC may have had some
effect on the behavior of firms. Ashenfelter and Heckman note that segregated
en a coefficient is negative, it is usually statistically
insignificant.46
white contractors were more likely to integrate than weresegregated non-
white contractors. Heckman and Wolpin note thatgovernment contracts were
awarded to less discriminatory firms. But none of those studiesprovides
a reliable quantitative measurement of the direct impact of OFCC on black
status.
Another shred of evidence on this issue is contributed by Smith
and Welch (1976) in their analysis of 1960 and 1970 Census data. In their
excellent analysis of male wages, they find evidence of a differentially
greater increase in black—white wage differentials in industries more depend-
ent on the government, and hence more liable to intervention by OFCC.1 This
is so because both black and white wages are higher in the coveredsector
than in the noncovered sector, but white wages are proportionately higher than
black wages.
An increase in black real wages in the covered sectormay boost black
real wages in the uncovered sector more than white realwages if the mobility
of blacks to the covered sector is greater than the mobility of whitesto the
covered sector, and hence (perversely) understated.2
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we review recent evidence on the impact of anti—
discrimination legislation on the labor market status of black Americans.
Twotypesof evidence are considered: analyses of aggregate time series of
relative black status and microeconomic analyses of the impact of particular
programs.
Freeman's influential time series evidence on governmental impact on
black status is shown to be less convincing than is generally assumed in
popular discussions. Macro relative wage and income data are quite sensitive
1The measure of dependency is the fraction of industry sales to the
federal government.
conclusion assumes that minority employment in covered sectors
increases. If it decreases, cross sectional estimates overstate the true
policy impact.47
to the relative number of blacks in the labor force, and the composition
of the black work force. As the relative number of blacks in the work
force declines, and as low wage blacks are siphoned out of the labor force
by transfer programs, measured relative wages of blacks tend to rise. Such
growth in relative black status has nothing to do with a lessening of dis-
crimination against blacks. We present some evidence (in Appendix A) that
part of the observed decline in black labor force participation is due to
increased benefit levels of government transfer programs. This analysis
suggests that Freeman's measured impact of government programs on black
status confuses supply shifts related to federal transfer program activity
with demand shifts related to federal antidiscriminatjon activity. Govern-
ment impact on the supply of labor explains the rise in the relative wage
rates of blacks that occurred at precisely the same timethat relative
labor force participation rates for prime age black makes declined, and
labor force participation rates for black women became stationary, after
a long period of growth.
The best available micro studies document considerable evidence of
governmental antidiscrimination activity at the firm level but are silent
on the question of governmental impact on black status. Some studies show
weekly perverse effects of legislation. For example, enforcement of both
wage equality and employment provisions of Title VII legislation appears to
result in lower relative employment for blacks (Belier, 1974). Other studies
that appear to show favorable impacts of government activity are shown, on
closer scrutiny, to be inherently ambiguous as to their true interpretation.
Having stated essentially negative conclusions, it is important to
note that there is evidence that the labor market for young black Americans48
has dramatically improved in recent years (Freeman (1977), Smith and Welch
(1976)). If antidiscrimination programs are effective at all, they are
likely to have their largest impact on young workers. This is so because
firms prefer to train younger workers——with longer expected working lives——
and younger workers are able to more fully adjust to revised expectations
of labor market opportunity than are older workers, who would find retrain-
ing less profitable. The analysis of Freeman and Smith and Welch, as well
as the sharp rise in black school enrollment rates in the mid—sixties,
suggests that antidiscrimination legislation may have had a real impact.
But the data are too crude to support this conclusion, especially
for the aggregate of black workers. At our current level of understanding,
themosthonest summary of existing knowledge of government impact on the
status of blacks is to say that there is no evidence that government




A Brief Discussion of the Time Series Evidence
In this appendix, we present a brief account of an extensive
analysis of the time series of black—white income differences reported
more fully elsewhere (Butler and Heckman, 1976). This work does not claim
to offer a complete explanation of the aggregate data but does present some
new results, and causes us to discard some old results, due to Freeman, that
have gained widespread currency in popular discussions.
The data discussed here are a sample of annual observations from
the Current Population Survey for the period 1948—1974. We thus use three
more observations than Freeman (for the years 1972—1974). The expansion
of the data base does not alter the conclusions to be drawn from his model.
Rather, the specification of the relative demand curve is the important
point. In order to focus on essential issues, we are faithful to Freeman's
functional forms and definitions of variables except for some inessential
changes noted in Appendix B. That appendix also gives a complete descrip-
tion of data sources and methods used to construct variables.
Table A—i reports our regression results for males while Table A—2
reports regression results for women. The key before these tables defines
the variables used in the regression analysis. The numbers reported in each
column are the regression estimates of the effect of the variable listed at
the top of the column on the dependent variable listed in the appropriate
row. "t" statistics are recorded below each regression coefficient.
To understand these results, consider the first row of Table A—i
which reports empirical estimates of one of Freeman's models (1973). Reading50
across the columns, the effect of an additional year is to raise relative
income by 1/2 percent; a one percent deviation from the trend of real GNP
raises relative income by .72 percent, while an additional 10 percent of
accumulated real EEOC expenditures per nonwhite worker (this represents




Key to Tables A—i and A—2
(For a more precise definition of variables, see Appendix B.)
Ralative Median Income —thelogarithm of the ratio of the median
income of all black males to the median
income of all white males. This measure
includes earnings and transfer payments.
Relative Median Earnings —asimilar measure for the earnings of
workers
Relative Median Wage/Salary —selfexplanatory
Income for Year Round Full—
Time Workers
C —anintercept term
TIME —isa linear time variable initialized at
1 in 1947
the log of
DGNP —deviationof/real GNP from a fitted trend
line (measured in 100 billion dollar units)
RLFMT —theratio of the labor force participation
rate of blacks to the labor force partici-
pation rate for whites (defined separately
for each sex)
ED —theratio of the median education of nonwhites
to the median education of whites (defined
separately for each sex)
AID —theaverage real monthly payment per recipient
to individuals participating in the aid to
families with dependent children (AFDC)
IJNCOMF —theaverage real monthly unemployment


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The models that correspond to those reported in Freeman's original
analysis are reported in rows 1, 5 and 9 in each table. With the exception
of the equation for the relative median income of females (row 1 of Table
A—2), our empirical results support Freeman's contention that cumulated
EEOC expenditure, interpreted as a proxy for federal antidiscrimination
activity, elevated the labor market status of blacks.
Suppose, however, that the assumption that blacks and whites are
perfect substitutes in demand is relaxed. This can be done by adding a
relative quantity variable (the ratio of blacks to whites) to the list of
variables in the relative demand curve. This modification permits the
demand equation to resemble DD' in Figure 1. If relative quantities are
added to the model, certain technical difficulties in estimation arise.
These are resolved by use of standard statistical methods)
There are dramatic empirical consequences of relaxing Freeman's
assumption about factor substitution. To see this, look at rows 2, 6 and
10 in each table. In all but one case, in the modified relative demand
equations the measured impact of federal activity becomes quantitatively
negligible and statistically insignificant. Moreover, in the one aberrant
case (row 6 of Table A—2), the measured impact of EEOC become statistically
insignificant when relative education level (ED) is added to the equation
(row 7 of Table A-2). There are strong prior reasons for including this
variable in the relative demand function to adjust•for racial changes in skill
endowment.
The empirical results for the male equations show that there is
reasonably strong evidence that the relative male demand curve is downward
1The technique is two stage least squares. The instrumental variables
are EEOC, DGNP, AID, UNE and ED.55
sloping. When relative education is added to the female
equation (rows 3, 7 and 11 of Table A—2), the same conclusion carries over
to the female results.1
An alternative way of telling the same story is given in lines
4, 8 and 12 of each table. The empirical results reported there are estimates
of the dependence of measured relative wages and incomes on all the factors
that determine both relative demand and relative supply in thesystem (i.e.,
in the econometric jargon, these are "reduced form" estimates). When
account is taken of the real value of transfer payments per recipient, there
is no measured effect of federal antidiscrimination activity on relative
wages and incomes.
In results not reported here (see Butler arid Heckman 1976), we
discuss the relationship between relative labor force participation rates
and transfer program benefits. Rising levels of AFDC payments help to
explain the observed decline in black male headship rates (see Chart 6, p. 12
andChart11, p. 56). As black male participation in family life declines,
so does their labor market participation——married males of any race are more
likely to participate in the market than single or unattached males. Black
female participation in AFDC programs serves to retard growth in their labor
force participation. More generally, the AID variable used in our analysis
may be viewed as a proxy for the entire package of social welfare programs,
including A.FDC, that favored low income workers, and hence blacks, and
resulted in declines (or decelerations) in black labor force participation
rates. Even without a marital disruption effect, income transfer programs
raise the minimumwagethat recipients will voluntarily accept in order to
work, and hence an expansion of the benefit levels in social programs leads
to a reduction in work activity, and an increase in relative black wage rates
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if blacks and whites are imperfect substitutes in demand. To the extent
that social programs selectively eliminate low income blacks from the
labor force, and hence the measured statistics, they accentuate the effect
of movement up the relative demand curve induced by a reduction in the
number of blacks relative to the number of whites.
In contrast with the effect of most income transfer programs,
increases in the real level of unemployment compensation benefits (UNCOMP)
are expected to raise the minimum acceptable wage required to perform
market work more for whites as a group than for blacks. This is so because
proportionately more whites work in sectors covered by unemployment insurance
than do blacks. Tables A—3, A—4 and A—5 provide evidence in support of this
argument.
Table A—3 records the importance of income, by type, as a fraction
of the total income received by persons 14 years and older. For bothsexes,
the proportion of total income due to welfare (WEL) is at least five times
larger for nonwhites than it is for whites. Table A—4 shows the same
pattern with respect to the distribution of aid in 1968. For example, only
1.5 percent of white males over 14 received welfare while 5.6 percent of
black males did. The interesting fact that emerges from this table is that
a greater proportion of white women receive unemployment compensation than
do nonwhite women (the COMPEN variable includes unemployment and workmen's
compensation, government employee pensions, and veterans payments), and
unemployment compensation represents a larger fraction of their income.
While unemployment compensation Is roughly the same proportion of Income for
males of both races, a higher proportion of white males receive unemployment
compensation than do black males. Finally, note the overall pattern revealed
in the income level regressions of Table A—5. AID has a generally positive
employment rates or relative labor force are used as measures of the relative





W NW W NW W NW
WAGE WEL COMPEN
W NW W NW W NW
1968 .786 .866 .002 .013 .016 .020
1969 .792 .868 .002 .013 .018 .021
1970 .791 .864 .002 .013 .022 .025
1971 .784 .839 .002 .014 .025 .026
1972 .781 .857 .002 .012 .025 .026
1973 .776 .861 .002 .009 .024 .023
1974.778 .841 .003 .014 .029 .032
.754 .772 .015 .101 .020 .015
.754 .787 .016 .096 .018 .018
.754 .782 .019 .104 .022 .016
.746 .758 .019 .124.023 .017
.736 .761 .019 .114 .022 .016
.733 .754 .019 .117 .022 .015
.720 .749 .022 .110 .026 .017
Proportior of income coming from wages and salaries (WAGE); public S
assistance and welfare (WEL); and unemployment and workers compensation,





1969 .804.843 .017 .057 .102 .084
1970.799 .836 .019 .062 .124 .103
1971.798 .812 .019 .067 .131 .105
1972 .793 .812.018 .062 .126 .099
S
1973 .796 .824 .016 .052 .115 .095
1974 .789 .804 .022 .071.140 .118
.716 .748 .028 .176 .054 .037
.717 .758 .041 .178.056 .046
.708 .727 .047 .203.063 .051
.703 .702 .048 .233.066 .054
.695.688 .049 .236 .065 .053
.701.699.046.221.060.046
.692 .694 .057.238 .073 .054
MALES FEMALES
WAGE WEL COMPEN
W NW W NW W NW
WAGE WEL COMPEN
W NW W NW W NW
Number of people receiving wage, WEL, and COMPEN (as defined in
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impact on the level of female income with a much stronger effect for black
females than for whites. Unemployment compensationpayments clearly result
in larger increases in white male income than in black male income.
The upshot of this discussion is that the aggregate data do not
support the argument that measured growth in relative black wages and
income is due to federal antidiscrjxninatjou efforts as measured in the
literature. Part of the measured growth is more properly attributed to
increasing social expenditure in the sixties which led to a withdrawal of
black workers——especially low wage black workers——from the labor force.
However, we do not shift to the other extreme and conclude that
all of the measured relative wage growth of blacks is due to the reduction
of blacks from the work force. The excellent studies of Freeman (1977)
and Smith and Welch (1976) refute any such conclusion. Nor do we deny
that antidiscrimination activity may have had some effect on raising black
status. A noteworthy finding in both the Freeman and Smith and Welch
analyses is that yowg black workers have made spectacular gains in relative
status in recent years. 4oreover, the data on school enrollment rates for
blacks shows a sharp increase in the mid—sixties——precisely what would be
expected if their long term prospects in the labor market had been improved
byantidiscrinijnatjon legislation. Since it is likely that antidiscrimination
programs have their greatest impact on young workers who can still alter
their career plans, this evidence tends to support the view that antidiscrimi—
nation legislation may have had a beneficial Impact.
The important point to extract from our analysis is that for the
group of blacks as a whole, there is little evidence from the time series
that antidiscrimination legislation has altered relative black status. And62
for this group, there is considerable evidence that social transfer
programs have played an important, albeit not monolithic,role in





Median income includes all income for persons 14years of age
and older receiving Income. The median wage and salary incomegroup consists
of all wage and salary income for persons 14years of age and over receiving
such income. Year round, full—time income refers to allwage and salary
income of year round, full time workers. Due to the lack of published
data, the regional figures refer only to median income. All these figures
(except for the 1949 regional income figures, which came from the U.S.
Census of Population, 1950, Detailed Characteristics) come from thefollowing
issues of the U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
P—60:5(1947), 6 (1948), 7 (1949), 9 (1950), 11 (1951), 14 (1952),
16(1953), 19 (1954), 23 (1955), 27 (1956), 30 (1957), 33 (1958), 35 (1959),
37 (1960), 39 (1961), 41 (1962), 43 (1963), 47 (1964), 51 (1965), 53(1966),
60 (1967), 66 (1968), 75 (1969), 80 (1970), 85 (1971), 90 (1972), 97 (1973)
101 (1974), and 103 (an advanced report on 1975). The last eight issues
alsoprovided the information for Tables A and B in the Appendix.
DGNP, TIME, and EEOCYR
Consistent with the original Freeman study (1973) our time variable
takes a value of 1 beginning in 1947, and our deviation fromgross national
product (DGNP) is computed using Freeman's computed trend (see his footnote 8)——
that
though it should be noted /hisdata goes up to 1972 and our data extends through
based on a
1975. The reported EEOC budget is /fiscalyear from July 1 to June 30,
and it appears to us that Freeman used this fiscalyear measure in the64
construction of his EEOC variable. The corrected calendar year variable
(the log of accumulated real EEOC calendar year expenditures per nonwhite worker)
is of course highly correlated with Freeman's variable, shows only a
marginally smaller effect, and is the variable we employ in the above
regressions.
Education, Labor Force Participation Rates
These data come from the 1976 Employment and Training Report of
the President and the 1975 Handbook of Labor Statistics. The labor force
participation rates are for the civilian labor force 16 years and over, and
are only available to 1948. Education refers to the median years of school
completed by the civilian labor force 18 years and older, and is available
only for selected years before 1964. We employed Freeman's interpolated
values for the missing years.
AID and UNCOMP
Average monthly payment per recipient in the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program came from the 1974 and 1975 Annual Statistical
Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin.The 1975 Statistical Abstract
the
of the United States and/1970 edition of the Bureau of the Census' Historical
Statistics of the United States contain data on the average monthly unemploy-
ment compensation per beneficiary.
Additional Data Used in the Tables
The proportion of nonwhite female headed familicasare from the
following issues of the U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P—20: 16 and 17 (1947), 26 (1949), 33 (1950), 44 (1952), 53 (1953),
67 (1954 and 1955), 75 (1956), 83 (1957), 88 (1958), 100 (1959), 106 (1960),65
116 (1961), 125 (1962), 139 (1963 and 1964), 153(1965), 164 (1966),
173 (1967), 191 (1968), 200 (1969), 218 (1970), 233(1971), 251 (1972),
258 (1973), 276 (1974), and 291 (1975. Weinterpolated for the missing
1949 and 1951 data.66
.
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